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E-Commerce Regulation: Necessity, Futility, Disconnect 
 
Dr Eliza Mik1 
 
 
[I]t’s much easier to proclaim yet another digital revolution – and to coin a requisite buzzword – than to wait 
and see if the observed change, instead of being a complete overthrow of established practices and principles, 
is just a shift in order and magnitude.2  
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Existing e-commerce regulations constitute a premature and unnecessary interference in the 
natural evolution of commercial practices and technologies. I question not just their quality, 
mainly attributable to the technological ignorance of the regulator, but their very necessity. I 
observe the practical futility of drafting effective regulatory instruments in areas subject to 
continuous and unpredictable technological change. I criticize the overly homogenous 
approach to “everything Internet” (i.e. everything involving the Internet requires new law) as 
well as the creation of new regulatory spheres and legal categories. Some might claim that it 
is too early for a critical retrospective of this subject. Despite its relative “youth,” however, 
the “law of e-commerce” has developed a set of orthodox approaches. It is therefore not too 
early to present some heterodox views, especially given the largely unsuccessful regulatory 
activity in the European Union. Not just technologies but also theories about the Internet can 
become obsolete within a short period of time and should therefore be subject to constant 
revision. 
 
 
Introduction  
Within a few years from its inception, e-commerce has become a heavily regulated area of commercial 
activity. From the mid-90’s regulators went into a drafting frenzy, which resulted in a multitude of legal 
instruments designed to “facilitate” or “enable” e-commerce. Allegedly, too much uncertainty was present in 
this “initial phase” and the law was unable to accommodate the changed communication landscape. The 
feeling of urgency was accompanied by sensationalistic statements regarding the indispensability of digital 
cash and strong encryption technologies. Without them, e-commerce could not exist. Neither prediction 
proved accurate. Although e-commerce is almost 20 years old, we still live with the legacy of a regulatory 
overreaction, a thicket of regulations drafted in an era when e-commerce was in the early stages of 
development, the underlying technologies were generally misunderstood 3 and the business models were yet 
to crystallize. The dot.com era came and went. Conceptually, however, e-commerce regulation remains stuck 
in the 90’s. A critical look at the regulatory output to date seems apposite. Below, I question not just the 
quality but the very necessity of regulating e-commerce – at least to the extent it concerns the transactional 
aspect of value exchange. I criticize the overly homogenous approach to “everything Internet” and the 
creation of new legal categories. I also observe how existing e-commerce regulations create (or at least 
contribute to) legal uncertainty by remaining disconnected from the relevant technologies. My vantage point 
is the English common law of contract, an area of law that remains the foundation of many market economies 
and underpins virtually every e-commerce transaction.4  
 
Definitions and Divisions 
Every regulatory endeavor requires a clear delineation of the regulatory target.5 The definition of “e-
commerce” has normative overtones. We must not intermingle regulatory spheres and areas of law. We must 
also understand the technologies and their legal implications, if any. As I associate “regulation” with external !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Assistant Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. This work is an extended version of a paper of the same name, 
presented at the First International Conference on Technologies and Law,  8 & 9 November 2013 in Porto, Portugal; published in the 
conference proceedings; I. Portela, et al eds.,  2013 Polytechnic Institute of Cávado and Ave, Barcelos. Research on this project was 
funded by an internal SMU research grant.  
2 E Morozov, To Save Everything Click Here (Allen Lane, London 2013) 36 
3 In the words of Prof A Boss commenting on the preparation of the UNCITRAL Model Law: “Electronic commerce was so sufficiently 
new and unfamiliar to people that substantial time was spent in the negotiating sessions understanding the technologies and their use, as 
well as attempting to ascertain the manner in which existing law did or did not apply, or how it applied, to electronic transactions” at 
887 in A. Boss, 2009 ‘The Evolution Of Commercial Law Norms: Lessons To Be Learned From Electronic Commerce’ Brook J Int’l L 
34, 673  
4 A Murray, Information Technology Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010) 413  
5 J Black ‘What is Regulatory Innovation?’ in Regulatory Innovation: A Comparative Analysis (Edward Elgar 2005) 12 
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intervention, I use the term to denote legal instruments enacted by legislatures or state agencies, including 
implementations of directives, model laws and conventions.6 The most important definition, however, is that 
of “e-commerce.” In its narrow meaning, “e-commerce” is the use of Internet-based methods of 
communication to enter and perform transactions.7 Such “transactional approach” is also implicit in the term 
“commerce” which, in its dictionary meaning, refers to the activity of buying and selling. This implies that 
most legal questions in e-commerce are governed by contract law. Accordingly, e-commerce concerns two 
parties agreeing on an exchange of value by means of Internet-based methods of communication. The latter 
constitute the main justification for regulation. The popular association of e-commerce with the Internet has, 
however, some undesired side effects. As practically all communication methods use the Internet as a 
transmission mechanism, most transactions at a distance can be classified as e-commerce. This technical 
detail (i.e. the intermediation of the Internet) has important legal implications. Once we create the legal 
category and a bespoke regime for e-commerce, a fuzzy definition of the term will result in an unclear scope 
of this regime. The special rules may inadvertently govern transactions normally not regarded as e-commerce, 
e.g. parties contracting by phone. It may thus be impossible to ensure a clear-cut, separate co-existence of 
traditional and e-commerce-specific rules. We must also ask the broader question whether having two regimes 
contributes to legal certainty. The latter is usually brandished as the reason for e-commerce regulation. Is it 
desirable to have different rules depending on whether an order is placed on a website or at a counter? Should 
we distinguish between contracts made on a mobile phone and those made on a landline? The UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Electronic Commerce (“MLEC”) is of little assistance as it associates e-commerce with 
Electronic Data Interchange (“EDI”) and paperless methods of communication.8 References to EDI are, 
however, misconceived as EDI relates to the automated exchange of structured data on the basis of prior 
agreement on a closed network.9 E-commerce, on the other hand, involves transactions between strangers, 
absent agreement, over open unsecured networks, such as the Internet.10 The MLEC also indicates that e-
commerce includes transactions concluded by telex and telegram.11 Why, however, would we need new 
regulations given that both telex and telegram have been in commercial usage long before the emergence of 
the Internet? 12 After all, contract law has “neatly accommodated the telegraph, telephone, television, and 
fax.”13 It is also unclear which aspect of Internet-based communications constitutes the “trigger” for 
regulatory activity. It cannot be the mere fact that parties transact at a distance at faster speeds than before… 
 
Additional complications arise when a border meaning of e-commerce is adopted, one encompassing areas 
ancillary to the commercial exchange, e.g. data protection or domain name ownership. Contributing to this 
confusion is the E-Commerce Directive14 (“ECD”) which, being horizontal in nature, concerns not only 
online transactions but also search engines, spam and intermediary liability. The latter, however, are not 
commerce strictly speaking. Neither the Internet service provider nor the search engine participates in the 
transaction. The regulatory reach of the ECD is further blurred by the definition of “information society 
services” and its overlap with the concept of “coordinated filed.”15 Despite the multitude of instruments 
enacted with e-commerce in mind, it remains unclear what e-commerce is. At least from a purely legal 
perspective. This may also be partially attributable to an association of e-commerce with the commercial 
utilization of the Internet in general: e.g. selling connectivity and server space. Commercial exchanges 
occurring by means of Internet-based technologies must, however, be distinguished from questions of Internet 
access. The network as the object of commerce must be distinguished from the network as a platform for 
commerce. The former combines aspects of common carriers, broadcasting, and print transactions, areas 
historically subject to heavy regulation.16 The latter, on the other hand, remains generally transparent. This 
conflation of network-uses and regulatory spheres may have contributed to a regulatory spill-over and created 
inroads into an area that has been regulated only minimally: contract law.   
 
I must pause here. Our consciousness is filled with heated debates regarding government surveillance, file 
sharing and cyber-attacks. Unquestionably, the technological challenges in some areas are unprecedented. An !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 R Baldwin, M Cave, M Lodge, Understanding Regulation – Theory, Strategy, Practice (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2012) 3 
7 See generally: K C Laudon, C G Traver E-commerce: Business, Technology, Society (9th ed, Prentice Hall 2013) 
8 MLEC Guide to Enactment p 1 
9 The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, ‘The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange – A Report and Model Trading 
Partner Agreement’ (1990) 45 Bus Law 1645; W Hauser RFC 1865 ‘EDI Meets the Internet’ (1996)  
10 J B Ritter, J Y Gliniecki ‘Electronic Communications and Legal Change: International Electronic Commerce and Administrative Law: 
The Need for Harmonized National Reforms’ (1993) 6 Harv J Law & Tech 263, 266  
11 MLEC Art 2, definition of “data message” 
12 D Rowland, U Kohl, A Charlesworth, Information Technology Law (Routledge 4th ed. 2012) (“Information Technology Law”) 233 see 
also J H Sommer, Against Cyberlaw (2000) 15 Berkeley Tech L J 1145 “The law of electronic commerce has also been around since at 
least the 1860s and has been the topic of legal analysis since at least the 1920s.” 1188 
13 J D Bick, ‘Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?’ (1998) 19 Pace L Rev 41, 61  
14 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular, electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
15 See generally Information Technology Law 268-270 
16 L B Solum, M Chung, ‘The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law’ (2004) 79 Notre Dame L Rev 815  
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example is the law of copyright, which confronts the digitization of protected content and the distribution 
capabilities of peering technologies. These challenges create an intellectual climate that all legal areas 
somehow affected by the Internet require regulatory intervention to “make law compatible with technological 
progress.” It is overlooked, however, that some areas are affected less than others. The assumption that the 
legal system as a whole is conceptually unprepared for the “Internet revolution” is incorrect. Law in its 
present state is capable of addressing most problems pertaining to technological change.17 In particular, this 
applies to contract law. I suspect that as we are less inclined to regulate traditional legal areas, we re-
categorize them as something new. To justify “regulatory creativity,” aspects of contract law are re-packaged 
as “cyberlaw.”18 Even the latter, however, concerns the application of existing legal norms!19 In other words, 
irrespective of whether we examine contract law in isolation or whether we treat some of its features as part of 
a different legal category – its rules can be applied in their present state with little modification. As discussed 
below, such modification, or “fine-tuning” can be achieved by a careful post factum interpretation of existing 
rules in light of actual transacting scenarios, as performed by the courts.  There is, however, no need for a 
general reform of contract law. Such impression might have been created by the popular rhetoric of the 
“Internet revolution” and pervasive references to “disruptive change” and “innovation.”20 
 
I do not, however, deny that there are differences between on-line and off-line transactions. I only question 
whether they warrant a separate legal category or the creation of new law.21 I also doubt whether such 
differences create problems that are truly new and unprecedented. The common law of contract is formulated 
in broad terms that provide the flexibility to absorb technological change.22 To illustrate: the tenet of contract 
law is intention, which must be communicated. Contracts are, after all, the product of communication23 and 
Internet-based interactions affect the manner in which this intention is conveyed. Neither the performance of 
the contract nor the remedial regime upon breach, are significantly changed by the new technologies. 
Interesting questions may arise when we analyze risk transfer in the case of digital products that are 
downloaded. Similarly, some uncertainty surrounds the moment of effectiveness of acceptances 
communicated by electronic means. In principle, however, the fact that some contractual subject matter is 
digital or that transactions occur faster and have a wider geographical reach can hardly justify regulation or 
necessitate new legal principles. The broad term “communication” can be interpreted to accommodate new 
technologies of manifesting intention. It has even been observed that “when electronic transactions are treated 
the same as comparable offline transactions, there is no need to define electronic commerce.”24 E-commerce 
is commerce. It did not “emerge” into a legal vacuum and does not deserve its own legal category. If we 
regulate contract law, we risk not only duplicating but also interfering with existing rules.  
 
Contract law is regulated sparingly. The legislative history of every statute affecting private agreement is 
based on generations of observation and the court’s inability to address systemic deficiencies.25 Other 
examples concern statutes consolidating existing practices, e.g. the Sale of Goods Act 1979, or simplifying 
existing principles to ensure a better remedial regime, e.g. the Misrepresentation Act 1967. Regulation also 
occurs “at the edges of contract law” and concerns specific industries that may require additional safeguards, 
e.g. pharmaceuticals. The substance of contract law remains generally unaffected: neither the manner of 
forming a contract nor its terms are prescribed. Although most e-commerce instruments claim to address 
exclusively the electronic form of online transactions, they often affect substantive contract law. Some of this 
is done in the name of consumer protection and must be regarded as part of a broader trend unrelated to 
technological change.26 Some provisions, however, directly interfere with the contracting sequence27 or alter 
established rules pertaining to the objective evaluation of intention.28 To illustrate: Article 11 of the E-
commerce Directive (“ECD”) prescribes that all website orders be immediately acknowledged. The legal 
character of such acknowledgment is, however, unclear. While it does not constitute acceptance, it extends the 
contracting sequence by an additional step. Lloyd calls this an “unnecessary complication.” 29 The obligation 
to acknowledge receipt also clashes with the requirement to provide a mechanism to correct errors, contained 
in the same article. Which should come first? What is the status of an erroneous order that has been !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 L Bennet Moses, ‘Recurring Dilemmas: The Law's Race To Keep Up With Technological Change’ (2007) U Ill J L Tech. & Pol'y 239 
18 For an interesting debate: L Lessig ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach Us’ (1999) 113 Harv L Rev 501 
19 V Mayer-Schönberger, The Shape Of Governance: Analyzing The World Of Internet Regulation (2003) 43 Va. J. Int'l L. 605, 609; U 
Kohl, ‘Legal Reasoning and Legal Change in the Age of the Internet – Why the ground rules still are still valid’ (1999) 7 Int J L&IT 123 
20 e.g. L Downes, The Laws of Disruption (Basic Books, New York 2009) 
21 Ch Reed, Making Laws for Cyberspace (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) 106 
22 H Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999) 47 
23 S Smith, P Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford) 182 
24 Information Technology Law at 233 
25 e.g.: Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, addressing the inability of third parties to enforce contracts made for their benefit. 
26 e.g. Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994, S.I. 1994/3159 (U.K.) amended by the 1999 Regulations of the same name 
(S.I. 1999/2083) 
27 See: ECD Article 10, Art 11, MLEC Art 14, Art 15 
28 UNCITRAL Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, Art 11 
29 I J Lloyd, Information Technology Law (6th ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011) 455 
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acknowledged? Once we add the right to withdraw from a contract,30 the entire transacting process becomes 
distorted. Determining the moment of contract formation as well as the respective legal positions of the 
parties becomes more difficult. Regulators often forget that contract law forms a fine-tuned ecosystem of 
rules that developed during centuries of actual usage. It is impossible to “just add things” without thoroughly 
examining how such “additions” work within this ecosystem - especially if the aim is ensuring legal certainty.   
 
A Technological Disconnect 
If the regulator decided to regulate e-commerce, one would assume that the resulting instruments should 
allow for the technological characteristics of online transactions.31 After all, these characteristics are the 
raison d’etre for regulation! Existing e-commerce instruments are, however, frequently tainted by a 
misunderstanding of the relevant technologies and, consequently, by a frequent disconnect between what the 
law can prescribe and what is technologically feasible. Some technologies, or technological features, are 
overlooked; in other instances the regulator seems to misjudge their legal implications. The Internet is still 
perceived as a homogenous system, with too much emphasis being placed on the meaningless term 
“electronic.”32 Regulatory approaches generally lack technological granularity: regulators fixate on the 
metanarrative of the Internet instead of analyzing the impact of individual technologies and applications.33 
The resulting disconnect is partially attributable to a nebulous concept underlying virtually all e-commerce 
regulations: “technology neutrality.” 34 Interestingly, “technology neutrality” gained prominence at a time 
when new technologies proliferated. The contradiction is obvious: if problems are technology specific, why 
should legal instruments addressing them be technology neutral?35 It also appears questionable to use 
“technology neutrality” as a guiding principle in legal reform, if the law has never been technology neutral. If 
it was – adaptations would not be necessary and we would not be regulating in the first place. Technology 
neutrality can easily turn into technology ignorance and misplaced regulatory focus.  
 
E-commerce regulation traditionally aims at “facilitating” or “removing obstacles.” The main “obstacles” are 
usually described as the absence of “writing” and “signatures.” Consequently, most e-commerce instruments 
prohibit discrimination on the basis that a contract originated in electronic form36 and establish electronic 
equivalents of “writing” and “signatures.” Two points arise. First, in English common law, the means of 
communicating agreement are irrelevant.37 Formalities, such as writing, may be required by laws other than 
contract law, e.g. statutes pertaining to land law. Moreover, transactions requiring formalities are frequently 
excluded from the reach of e-commerce regulations.38 Statements implying that “the success of e-commerce 
depends on the creation of equivalents of signatures and writing” are false. As contractual intention can be 
expressed in any manner, provisions that contracts can be formed electronically only state the obvious. 
Questions of evidence are conflated with questions of enforceability. Second, stating that the “electronic 
form” must not be a reason for discrimination ignores the fact that the form (i.e. the manner of expression) 
may affect the content and thus the legal effect of a statement. Interestingly, the term “discrimination” can be 
interpreted without its negative connotations of unjust or prejudicial treatment. “Discrimination” also means 
the recognition and understanding of differences. Negative effects can follow if such differences are not 
acknowledged. As discussed below, regulators have remained oblivious to the existence, not to mention the 
legal implications, of HTML and to the fact that the web consists of distributed, interconnected and 
interactive files.39 The “inter” in the “Internet” is usually ignored - despite its crucial importance. 
 
Writing and Disclosure 
While “writing” usually concerns formalities and disclosure obligations pertain to transparency in consumer 
dealings, their regulatory implementations have something in common: a disregard for practically all main 
protocols and formats of presenting information in distributed networked environments. “Writing” is 
associated with “accessibility for subsequent reference.”40 The length of such “accessibility” is not prescribed, 
however. As every website remains, by definition, accessible on a webserver – is it “in writing”? If so, do the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance 
contracts, Art 6 
31 D R Johnson and D Post, Law and Borders – The Raise of Law in Cyberspace (1996) 48 Stan L Rev 1367 at 1385 
32 E Mik, ‘The Unimportance of Being Electronic or - Popular Misconceptions About “Internet Contracting”’ (2011) 19 Int J Law Info 
Tech 324 
33 T Wu, Application Centered Analysis (1999) 85 Va L. Rev 1163  
34 B Koops, “Should Regulation be Technology Neutral?” in Starting Points for ICT Regulation, Deconstructing Prevalent Policy One-
Liners (ITeR 2006); U Kamecke,  T Korber, Technological neutrality in the EC regulatory framework for electronic communications: a 
good principle widely misunderstood (2008) E.C.L.R. 2008, 29(5) 330 
35 A Heinrich, K Manheim, D. J. Steele, At the Crossroads of Law and Technology (2000) 33 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 1035 at 1042. 
36 MLEC Art 5; CUECIC Art 8 
37 Ch Reed, “Online and Offline Equivalence: Aspiration and Achievement” (2010) 18 (3) Int J Law Info Tech at 255 
38 See, e.g. CUECIC Art 2, ECD Art 1 (5) 
39 The only time HTML is acknowledged is in MLEC Art 5 bis, which deals with incorporation by reference. This provision, however, 
was not incorporated into the Convention  
40 See MLEC Art 6; CUECIC Art 9 (2) 
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files it links to form part of its contents? What if the website remains minimized on the user’s screen? More 
importantly, should the “subsequent reference” display the same content as originally viewed? Which version 
of the website is decisive: the source file residing on the web-server or the version rendered by the browser? 
Needless to say, the type and version of the browser will determine which contents of the original file are 
displayed. Complications abound. The disconnect between law and technology becomes even more prominent 
when we examine disclosure requirements. The latter form the core of EU consumer protection regulations 
and usually dictate the provision of information regarding the online business, the contracting process and the 
contractual subject matter.41 They are designed to remedy the information asymmetries between online 
businesses and consumers.42 Some disclosure requirements are stated broadly: terms are regarded as unfair if, 
amongst others, the consumer had “no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the 
contract.”43 A term is in good faith if it is “expressed fully, clearly and legibly.”44 Problems arise when 
disclosure obligations are prescribed in more detail. Article 5(1) of the Distance Selling Directive (“DSD”) 
requires that an order confirmation be provided “in writing” or another “durable medium.” The latter refers to 
instruments enabling the user to “store information addressed personally to him in a way accessible for future 
reference for a period of time adequate to the purposes of the information and which allows the unchanged 
reproduction of the information stored.”45 Examples given are printouts, disks and hard drives. Similarly, the 
ECD requires that certain information be available in a way allowing storage and reproduction.46 Both 
“writing” and “disclosure” are thus tied to concepts that are inherently difficult to replicate online: persistent 
accessibility and durability. While durability implies physical storage and “accessibility for subsequent 
reference” may be fulfilled without producing a physical copy, both concepts require the capture and retention 
of the original contents displayed during the transaction. This, however, effectively precludes the use of 
interactive websites, which dynamically change their contents in response to external events, e.g. user input. 
The disconnect between law and technology is glaring. By disregarding the practical difficulties of preserving 
the content of websites, the regulations impose a very high level of IT literacy on both parties. In some 
instances, preservation may be plainly impossible. Provisions concerning “writing” and “durability” work 
well with PDF files and word documents, not with any actual website technology, such as HTML and 
AJAX.47  
 
The “durability” requirement was taken to its logical extreme, when the European Court of Justice debated 
whether it was met if information was provided via a link.48  The case concerned a popular transacting 
interface where the relevant information could be viewed through a link placed on the website or within an 
email sent after order placement. The Oberlandesgericht Wien held that the email did not “contain” the 
information. As the website could be modified it was not “available on a lasting basis.”49 DSD Art. 5(1) also 
required that the information be “received” or “given” to the consumer. This, however, implied that the 
consumer could not be expected to take any action, even as minimal as clicking a link.50 Moreover, 
information accessible via a link was neither “given” nor “received” because it was not shown directly.51 
Stating that websites should be equivalent to paper, the Court emphasized that durable media must ensure 
“possession of the information.”52 The website to which the link connected did not permit storage and 
reproduction in an unchanged form as the seller was able to amend the content unilaterally. The information, 
however, had to be “no longer under the control of the person giving it.”53 The mere possibility of printing or 
storing the page on the customer’s side was irrelevant as in such instance the durable medium was “generated 
by the user and not the vendor.”54 Consequently, the linked-to information did not qualify as a durable 
medium within the meaning of Art 5 (1). Oblivious to the practical implications of its decision, the Court 
stressed that any definition of “durable medium” should be formulated in abstract terms as the imposition of 
rigid constraints may produce negative results.55 The durability requirement renders the provision unworkable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 See e.g. ECD Art 10 
42 C Scott, Regulatory Innovation and the Online Consumer (2004) 26 Law & Policy 477; see also: B Koops, Law, Technology and 
Shifting Power Relations (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 973 at 1006 
43 UK Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 SI 1999/2083, implementing Council Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts, regs 5(1) and 8(1), Schedule 2(1)(i) 
44 Director General of Fair Trading v First National plc [2001] UKHL 52 
45 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market, 
Recital 24   
46 ECD Art 10(3) 
47 Asynchronous JavaScript and XML is a protocol suite enabling Web pages to partially refresh displayed content in real time  
48 Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer Case C-49/11, July 2012 
49 id para 24 
50 id para 33, contrast Art 4(1) DSD where information has to be “provided” 
51 id paras 35-37; for a detailed critique of this reasoning, see: C Goanta, Information Duties in the Internet Era: Case Note on Content 
Services v. Bundesarbeitskammer (2013) 2 European Review of Private Law, 643-660 
52 id para 42 
53 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, delivered 6 March 2012, referring to case C-49/11, at 42 
54 id at 43 
55 Content Services Ltd v. Bundesarbeitskammer Case C-49/11, July 2012 para 17 
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in practice.56 Both Directives ignore the difficulties of preserving content of interactive, dynamic websites, 
whereas the Court’s decision renders hyper-links virtually useless as a method of content delivery. The 
introduction of a physical element (“durability”) borders on the absurd: why would regulations designed to 
promote e-commerce contain provisions effectively preventing the use the most basic web technology – 
hyperlinks? Why does paperless trade require… paper? The question is not how to replicate “durability” in 
online transactions. The question is: why is durability required? The relevant provision epitomizes the 
disconnect between law and technology. It also illustrates a failure to use available technology to the 
consumer’s advantage. Interestingly, the MLEC provided for this very situation and stated that a link was the 
information,57 i.e. being referred to in a statement was synonymous with being contained in the statement.58 
The relevant provision was, however, never transposed into any local legislation. Given that the regulations 
superseding the DSD59 maintain the “durability” requirement, the use of hyperlinks for information disclosure 
remains uncertain. 
 
Signatures 
A similar disconnect is exemplified by virtually all digital signature regulations, most of which create 
“electronic equivalents” of traditional signatures and imply their indispensability for the success of e-
commerce. Several points arise. First, signatures are rarely a prerequisite of a valid transaction. Their 
“electronic equivalents” are thus not indispensable. Second, in common law jurisdictions signatures can take 
many forms, ranging from handwritten scribbles to “Xs.” Given these liberal “form requirements” (or absence 
thereof), practically any technology can be used to express assent and to constitute a signature - including a 
simple click.60 It could thus be argued that the implementation of the Electronic Signature Directive was not 
required in England and the resulting regulations are redundant.61 Many e-commerce laws combine a 
signature’s ability to express assent with the fulfillment of formal requirements.62 This “combination” is not 
necessarily present in traditional regimes. More importantly, most regulations require that digital signatures 
identify the signatory – again, a requirement generally absent off-line and extremely difficult to accomplish in 
open, networked environments such as the Internet. The latter is inherently anonymous and accessible to 
everyone without prior authentication. The architecture of the Internet, i.e. the core TCP/IP protocol suite, 
permits the identification of machines, networks and resources but not the identification of users. In other 
words, while any technology can be used to demonstrate assent, very few technologies can ensure 
identification. Moreover, it is not so much “identification” that is required (as anyone can assume any 
identity) but the confirmation of an identity, i.e. authentication. 63 The latter is central to establishing legal 
liability and enforceability.64 At present, the technologies capable of authenticating persons require prior 
enrollment as well as the creation of complex legal and technical infrastructures. In other words, they can 
operate within closed systems only. It must also be noted that despite assurances of technology neutrality, 
most regulations are drafted with public key cryptography in mind.65 Digital signatures derive, after all, from 
the mathematical correspondence between a private and a public key. 66 The public key must be accessible to 
everyone, the private key exclusively to its authorized user. Furthermore, a trusted third party must guarantee 
the association between the public key and such user. Consequently, digital signatures require the support of 
Certification Authorities and the issuance of Digital Certificates.67 Contrary to what is suggested by the 
regulations (and the accompanying scholarship) such “signatures” only guarantee that a specific message was 
transformed with a specific private key. In practice, the question “who signed the message?” boils down to 
establishing who used the private key. The quality or type of the encryption technology is largely irrelevant. 
The problem lies in securing the private key, which is often stored on an insecure networked computer and 
“protected” by a password. The security of the key is thus a function of the security of the password. Given 
the frequency and inevitability of network compromises, the technological framework for identification must 
be accompanied by detailed rules allocating liability for the unauthorized use of the private key.68 Regulations !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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prescribing “sole control” or a “unique link” between person and signature ignore the technological 
limitations of the network as well as the virtual impossibility of ensuring such “control” and “uniqueness.” A 
digital signature can be produced by anyone who uses the private key. The question is not one of forgery but 
of unauthorized use. In an attempt to increase certainty, the Electronic Signatures Directive (“ESD”) 
prescribes detailed technical requirements pertaining to “qualified certificates” and “secure-signature-creation 
devices.”69 In practice, given the complexity of the technologies involved, the relying party (i.e. the 
counterparty to the transaction with the purported signatory) needs the advice of a technical expert to establish 
whether such requirements have been met. Interestingly, even a detailed examination of a “qualified 
certificate” and the existence of a trustworthy “certification-service-provider” cannot guarantee the security of 
“secure-signature-creation devices.” The latter cannot (in the current state of technology) be “reliably 
protected by the legitimate signatory against the use of others.”70 We are back at square one.  Moreover, it is 
impossible to determine who used the private key from examining the certificate, qualified or not. Even an 
unauthorized use of the key produces an authentic signature. The UNCITRAL Law on Electronic Signatures 
(“MLES”) takes a less prescriptive approach and only requires that the electronic signature be “as reliable as 
appropriate for the purpose” a data message was generated or communicated. “Reliability” is, however, 
associated with the establishment of a unique link with the signatory and his sole control over the signature 
creation data.71 The relevant provision also emphasizes that “reliability” can be established “in any other 
way.” Interestingly, despite the lack of guidance, the latter scenario comes closest to real-life transacting 
scenarios, where it is always the individual decision of the relying party as to how much assurance he requires 
that the other person is who she claims to be. Why, however, suggest the use of digital signatures and then fall 
back on the default principle anyway? While the ESD can be accused of unnecessary complexity, the MLES 
is too vague to provide any guidance. Both seem to miss the point: the near impossibility of authenticating 
users in open-access environments like the Internet.  Theoretically, identification could be established only if 
access and use of the private key relied on biometric access controls. Biometrics, however, raise multiple 
concerns if deployed on a large scale, especially regarding the process of enrolment and the subsequent 
management of biometric data.72 The disconnect between the law and the technologies capable of its 
fulfillment, as well as the overly prescriptive approach of some regulations, has resulted in a general lack of 
success of practically all digital signature laws.73  
 
Legislation or Common Law?  
Despite my optimistic approach that e-commerce requires no regulation as most legal issues pertaining to 
online transactions can be subsumed under contract law, I cannot discard the possibility that an unprecedented 
problem may arise. Under English law, we must ask whether such problem should be addressed ex ante, by 
legislation, or left to post factum common law resolution.74 Any attempt at answering this question must start 
with a thorough analysis of the existing rules. Schellekens emphasises that regulators often fail to examine 
their re-usability.75 The fact that old principles become more difficult to apply, does not mean new principles 
are needed. In other words, we often assume that existing law cannot effectively accommodate new 
technologies. We also assume that new technologies are synonymous with new problems. New problems, in 
turn, require new law. In reality, many “old” problems that re-appear on the Internet may, at first glance seem 
different or unprecedented. An example is the use of standard terms, which have always raised concerns 
regarding the quality of consent, notice and availability. These concerns are addressed with new vigour, this 
time under the guise of “browse-wrap-” and “click-wrap” agreements. Both the problem and its solution are 
not new and perfectly addressable by “old” legal principles. The creation of new law can thus only be debated 
when a new problem arises and existing rules are unable to provide a solution. Even then, however, it is 
important to remain close to the original so as not to interfere with the traditional legal regime. The latter can 
be regarded as a natural regulatory constraint. In practice, apart from (a) establishing the true novelty of a 
legal problem and (b) confirming the inability of existing principles to address it, the challenges faced by the 
regulator boil down to capturing the complexity and ever-changing nature of Internet-based technologies. 
Capturing the present state of the technological landscape, while allowing for future change and 
accommodating existing law seems like an almost impossible task.   
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Futility   
The difficulties of drafting e-commerce regulations are best illustrated by the provisions dealing with 
“dispatch” and “receipt,” found in the Convention on Electronic Contracting. Two preliminary points arise. 
First, Reed emphasizes that divergence from the original principle reduces the normative force of new 
provisions.76 New rules must respect their offline predecessors and preserve the same allocation of risks or 
protection of interests.77 Second, we must assume that regulation must allow for the technical modalities 
affecting the contracting process. In our case: that the Internet constitutes a multilayered transmission 
infrastructure underpinning a practically unlimited number of diverse communication technologies. The latter 
involve multiple protocols and architectures, each of them differing in the presentation of information and the 
ability to interact in real-time. A provision tailored to email may thus not work for wall posts on facebook, a 
provision tailored to websites may be unable to accommodate instant messengers. The challenge often lies in 
identifying the salient feature that differentiates one communication method from another or that is difficult to 
subsume under existing legal rules due to the lack of a suitable analogy.   
 
These challenges are particularly visible in the context of establishing the time of contract formation and 
translating the offer-acceptance model onto new transacting scenarios. The basic contractual principle that 
intention must be communicated translates into the requirement that acceptance must be received.78 Only if an 
acceptance is sent via the post, its effectiveness is tied to dispatch.79 Although none of the e-commerce 
instruments answers the question whether acceptances communicated electronically are effective upon 
dispatch or receipt, the two terms are defined to accommodate either option. Their importance must not be 
underestimated: the moment of “dispatch” or “receipt” determines the time of formation, affects the 
incorporation of terms and the governing law. Precision is therefore of paramount importance: the existence 
of a contract is at stake. Unfortunately, it is the lack of precision that characterizes the relevant provisions. 
Article 10 of the Convention ties “dispatch” to the broad concepts of “loss of control” and “information 
system.” The moment the sender “loses control” of a message is, however, almost impossible to establish in 
Internet-based communications. Given the decentralized and distributed nature of the Internet - what does 
“control” relate to? Which part of the communication infrastructure or process is controlled by the user? The 
latter generally owns the client machine, the mail-server and connectivity are provided by ISPs. Mobile 
Internet access introduces its own set of idiosyncrasies (data roaming anyone?). “Control” can also be 
analyzed from a “vertical perspective,” i.e. across the layers of the TCP/IP protocol stack.80 Which layer is 
relevant: the physical network (cables and routers) or the abstract, software layers (applications)? Does 
control cease when a message exits the LAN or the intranet? How is it to be applied to cloud-based services, 
like gmail or hotmail? What if parties communicate within the same platform, such as facebook (e.g. a 
“friend” comments on a status update)? The definition of “information system” perpetuates the confusion by 
not distinguishing between e.g. a network and a server. It is unclear whether “control” and “information” 
system are logical or physical concepts. The technological configurations are many, even if we confine the 
analysis to basic client-server architectures. The problems do not end here. “Receipt” requires that messages 
become “retrievable.” 81  Both the principle of receipt and the postal acceptance rule assume the 
communication of acceptance, i.e. the readability of the message. Being “retrievable,” however, does not 
guarantee readability - mainly due to discrepancies in how email applications or browsers render content. This 
problem is partially addressed by the North American Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, which requires 
that dispatch be “proper” in terms of ensuring the ability to retrieve the message and the message being 
“processable” by the addressee’s system.82 In other words, senders must allow for the characteristics of the 
latter. It is, however, presently premature to prescribe “readability” as there are too many competing 
“standards” in displaying content. While only “readability” translates the requirement of communicating 
acceptance, we must accept that such translation may not be possible. Each communication method must be 
evaluated individually, also in light of the reasonableness of the addressee’s (i.e. offeror’s) choice of 
application. The provisions in the Convention are virtually unusable due to their vagueness and disconnect 
from the actual functioning of Internet-based communication technologies. I am not implying that the rule 
“acceptance must be communicated” cannot be translated. I am only pointing out that the diversity of 
communication methods cannot be captured by broad terms or reduced to “control” and “accessibility.” It is 
difficult to draft a one-size-fits-all law to govern all Internet-based communication methods.  Such “precision 
drafting” is theoretically possible but would require very detailed provisions, which (a) would easily become 
obsolete83 (b) their complexity would likely create uncertainty.84  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Complexity and speed of change  
It is not just the difficulty of accomodating e-commerce technologies and balancing flexibility with precision. 
Ex ante regulatory instruments face two additional challenges: the complexity of the technological 
environment and the speed of its change. We can speak of a constantly evolving regulatory target. When the 
first e-commerce laws were drafted neither the business models nor the technologies have fully matured. 
Interestingly, almost 20 years later, we still cannot assume that they have.  In fact, we cannot assume that the 
Internet has reached stasis. Feich and Werle emphasize the rapidly changing commercial usage and technical 
heterogeneity of the Internet.85 Effective regulation requires that the target be moderately stable or at least 
predictable.86  Predictability, however, can only be achieved with the benefit of extensive experience. In the 
case of e-commerce, regulators not only fail to understand the technologies and their individual significance 
but also the very speed of technological change. Technologies are not neutral constants.87  Constant change 
and evolution are inherent characteristics of the Internet. The end-to-end principle, the relative ease of 
creating new applications that run on the top-layer of TCP/IP, creates a fluid unpredictable environment. We 
can only speculate on how the Internet will develop as a system or how specific technologies will be used. 
The regulator can react, not predict. The status quo is of limited guidance as a regulatory reference – 
everything is subject to change. In this context, Brownsword warns against a naïve confidence in our 
regulatory intelligence.88 Complexity, change and the resulting unpredictability dictate regulatory restraint as 
neither the problem nor a solution is readily identifiable. According to de Vries, “the problem that regulation 
is intended to solve may be misidentified due to the complexity of the situation. Even if correctly identified, 
the problem may fix itself without intervention.”89 Interestingly, Lloyd observes that “it might be doubted 
whether the [E-commerce Directive] would have been adopted in the same form had the law-makers been 
able to predict the ways in which technology would develop.”90 If we subscribe to the principle that law 
should follow commercial practice, we must let commercial practice crystallize first. We may have to resign 
ourselves to the fact that the Internet, or e-commerce, will remain in a permanent state of development. We 
can talk of a permanent, accelerated evolution – not a revolution, as the latter term implies an abrupt change 
followed by a period of stability. We may soon look at the regulatory instruments drafted in the 90’s with the 
same sentiment we look at the Pac-Man game today. 
 
A common law, piecemeal approach 
In light of the above, common law rules, which are responsive not preemptive, seem better suited to address 
rapidly changing technologies and commercial practices. Common law is by definition more flexible than 
statute as the ratio decidendi is not confined by a set of words. In the words of one commentator: common 
law might be “resolutely backward-looking” but it is also innovative and creative.91 As illustrated by 
“dispatch” and “receipt,” ex ante legislation cannot address the multitude of technological configurations with 
sufficient precision to ensure certainty. Precision usually comes at the price of flexibility and may reduce the 
law’s ability to respond to future change. Only post factum case-specific solutions can address the complexity 
of the fast-moving communication landscape.92 Legislation can be debated when there is a need for reform or 
when “a real problem exists that the common law is demonstrably incapable of dealing with.”93 It can be 
doubted, however, whether such reform is needed in contract law. I must remind the reader: contract law must 
be distinguished from intellectual property law. Also, progress in communication technologies must be 
distinguished from progress in such areas as medicine and energy, both of which may raise public safety 
concerns and thus require ex ante regulatory intervention. According to Dworkin, it is safest to assume that no 
legal response is necessary and that if the necessity arises “the common law should be the presumptive first-
line response.”94 A clear distinction must, however, be drawn between civil and common law systems. In the 
former, there will be more statutory provisions incompatible with technological progress. Even then, however, 
some restraint must be exercised. When addressing formal requirements, the UK government warned against 
“regulatory haste” and broad approaches.  Instead of declaring across-the-board equivalence of electronic and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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traditional signatures, it advised to update individual primary legislation after a careful assessment of possible 
consequences.95 Only a case-by-case approach permitted a tailored response to each formal requirement in 
light of the available technology. Empirical evidence does in fact suggest that the case-by-case common law 
approach is more effective at addressing the legal aspects of e-commerce transactions than ex ante regulatory 
interventions.96 
 
Conclusion 
It is easy to criticize with the benefit of hindsight. It is also easy to learn from past mistakes. Despite its 
idiosyncrasies, e-commerce can exist within the existing legal framework - at least with regards to its purely 
transactional aspects. It can therefore be questioned whether we need “e-commerce” regulation in the first 
place. The latter is part of contract law and should be left to evolve gradually on a case-by-case basis in 
response to actual problems. At least in countries based on English common law.  
 
Apart from the questionable value of a regulatory sphere called “e-commerce,” existing regulations can be 
accused of imprecise target-setting:  neither the “removal of obstacles” nor the “promotion of e-commerce” 
are valid regulatory aims. Especially in light of the fuzzy definition of “e-commerce.” Given the speed of 
change, a certain degree of uncertainty will always be present.  As the future development of the Internet 
cannot be predicted, we cannot design rules based on its present state. The “present state” is transient. The 
variety of technologies and the resulting diversity of interactions will only increase and put additional strain 
on existing regulatory solutions. Short-term consumer protection might be necessary to accommodate the 
novelty of online communications. But this is where all interference should stop. E-commerce is best 
promoted by providing secure payment mechanisms, enabling paperless invoicing and increasing the 
reliability of the post to ensure order fulfillment. These are the areas where the EU Commission identified 
severe shortcomings.97 It is questionable whether e-commerce – assuming we decide to keep this term -  is 
promoted by the incorporation of additional steps in the contracting procedure or by the provision of 
electronic equivalents of “writing” and “signatures.” Ensuring that parties can fulfill formal requirements 
online seems less important than creating a transparent transacting sequence. Certainty stems from simplicity 
and continuity. The omnipresence of terms like “innovation,” “revolution” and “change” creates a temptation 
to break with tradition, to disrupt the law in similar fashion as the Internet has disrupted the communication 
landscape. It must be appreciated, however, that commerce requires continuity, a gradual evolution of law – 
not a revolution. Any uncertainty that persists in the area of e-commerce can be regarded as the product of 
regulatory ignorance - ignorance pertaining to both the law and the technologies involved in online 
transactions.   
 
The “precision vs. flexibility” conundrum becomes irrelevant when technology-specific legal problems are 
addressed post factum. Only incremental solutions provided by judicial decisions can address the complexity 
of the e-commerce environment. In this regard, common law based systems seem at an advantage. Law must 
follow commercial practice and stay connected to the technologies used in this practice. There would be 
nothing wrong with differentiating between online and offline transactions, as long as the special regime 
created for the latter (a) were tailored to the technologies in question, (b) fitted within the existing legal 
system. Creating legal instruments uniquely crafted to e-commerce transactions is, however, extremely 
difficult. Many e-commerce instruments can be accused of contributing to legal uncertainty by providing 
“solutions” which cannot work with the actual technologies involved or creating legal requirements that are 
technologically infeasible. The problem lies not in imprecise goal-setting but in impossible goal-setting. 
Lastly, the slightest drafting mistake may result in an interference with traditional principles.  Maybe it is 
better, not to regulate at all? Commerce requires certainty, legal continuity in the face of technological 
change. The introduction of new law always carries the risk of disruption. We must think twice before leaving 
the issue to the regulator.  
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